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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
ASSOCIATIONS-Statute requiring oath-bound associa-
tions to file constitution and membership oath with list of mem-
bers, which exempted labor unions and certain lodges, held to be
based on reasonable classification and constitutional.
Habeas corpus proceeding by the People of the State of New
York on relation of George C. Bryant against Charles F. Zim-
merman and others, the relator being held on a charge of violat-
ing a statute of New York, which in his petition was alleged to
be unconstitutional. Upon refusal of the lower court to dis-
charge him, which judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Div-
ision and by the Court of Appeals, Bryant sued out a writ of er-
ror to the Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground that
the statute was repugnant to the portion of the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which declares that:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". People of the State
of New York ex rel. Bryant s,. Zimmerman et al., 49 S. Ct. 61.
The statute alleged to be unconstitutional (art. 5-a, Civil
Rights Law; Laws 923, p. 1110, c. 664) provided that "every
membership corporation and every unincorporated association
having a membership of twenty or more pirsons, which corpora-
tion or association requires an oath as a prerequisite or condition
of membership, other than a labor union or a benevolent order
mentioned in the benevolent orders law-shall file with the sec-
retary of state a sworn copy of its constitution, by-laws, rules,
regulations and oath of membership, together with a roster of its
membership and a list of its officers for the current year," and
further, that "any person who becomes a member of any such
qorporation or association, or remains a member thereof, or at-
tends a meeting thereof, with knowledge that such corporation
or association has failed to comply with any provision of this
article, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The offense charged
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against relator was that he attended meetings and remained a
member of the Buffalo Provisional Klan of the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, an association to which this statute applied, but
which had not complied therewith, of which he was alleged to
have had knowledge.
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, the
Court held that the statute was not, as was alleged, unconstitu-
tional as repugnant to the 14th Amendment; that it neither
abridged the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, violated due process, nor denied equal protection of the
laws. In 'regard to the privilege and immunity clause, the Court
held that if to be a member of a secret, oath-bound association be
a privilege arising out of citizenship at all, it is an incident of state
rather than United States citizenship; it is not a privilege belong-
ing to citizens of the United States solely by reason of such cit-
izenship, and its abridgement by a state in no way conflicts with
the Federal Constitution. Slaughter House Cases, 21 L. Ed.
394; In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116.
The second contention of relator, that the statute violated
the due process clause in that it deprived him of liberty by pre-
venting him from exercising his right of membership in the as-
sociation, was declared by the Court to be unsound for the reason
that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the police power;
relator's liberty in this regard must yield to the rightful exercise
of this power, under which the state might prescribe and apply to
oath-bound associations any reasonable regulation calculated to
confine their purposes and activities within limits consistent with
the rights of others and the public welfare. Since the regulation
in question proceeded on the theory that the state within whose
territory and under whose protection the association exists is en-
titled to be informed of its nature and purpose ,of whom it is com-
posed, and by whom its activities are conducted, and on the
theory that requiring this information to be filed would effect-
ively deter violations of public and private right to which the
association might be tempted if such disclosure were not re-
quired, the requirement was not arbitrary or oppressive, but was
reasonable; the deprivation of relator's liberty in this manner and
to this extent was therefore justifiable.
The third contention made by relator, that the statute viol-
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ated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, was
based on the fact that it had no application to labor unions and to
several other associations having oath-bound membership, such
as the Masonic fraternity, the Knights of Columbus, the Odd
Fellows, and the Grand Army of the Republic, all of which were
provided for by another statute; it was contended that this was
improper discrimination against the Ku Klux Klan. But, said
the Court, a state enacting a statute to remedy a particular evil
may classify subjects of legislation with reference to the evil to
be prevented, and may properly discriminate against a particular
class from whom evil is mainly to be feared, providing, however,
that the classification is based on a real and substantial difference
and is not arbitrary; a statute applying to a certain class is not
invalid merely because other classes may do the same thing and
go unpunished, if it is found that the danger is characteristic only
of the class named. Pastone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138;
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 48 S. Ct. 553; Radice v. New
York, 264 U. S. 292. The Court upheld the conclusion reached
by the lower courts that the classification was justified by a differ-
ence between the two classes of associations shown by exper-
ience, the difference consisting in a manifest tendency on the part _
of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purposes and
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal
rights and public welfare, and in the absence of such a tendency
on the part of the other class. In so holding, it quoted with ap-
proval these statements made by the state courts concerning the
Ku Klux Klan; "It is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised
by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror
into the minds of the people", and further, that "it is a matter of
common knowledge that the association or organization of which
relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens."
And in pointing out the difference between this association
and the classes to which the statute had no application, the same
courts said; "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law
have already received legislative scrutiny and b~en granted spe-
cial privileges, so that the legislature may well consider them
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beneficent rather than harmful agencies ;" also, that "these or-
ganizations and their purposes are well known, many of them
having been in existence for many years. Many of them are
oath-bound and secret. But we hear of no complaints against
them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the
rights of -others."
In concluding its opinion, the Court stated its views of the
Klan ift such emphatic terms that there can be no doubt as to its
attitude towards this organization. Its views were stated thus:
"The order is a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time,
with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and
the A. P. A. orders of other periods; its membership is limited to
native-born, gentile, protestant whites; in part of its constitution
and printed creed it proclaims the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United States, in another
exacts of its members an oath to preserve and shield white su-
premacy, and in still another declares any person actively op-
posing its principles to be 'a dangerous ingredient in the b6dy
politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;' it is conducting a crusade against Catholics,
Jews and negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; it is striving for political power, and assuming a sort
of guardianship over the administration of local, state and na-
tional affairs ;. and at times is taking into its own hands the pun-
ishment of what some of its members conceive to be crimes."
House Committee Hearings, 1921, vol. 302; "The Challenge of
the Klan," Frost; "The Ku Klux Klan," Mecklin. This indict-
ment of the Klan and denunciation of the principles on which it
was founded and for which it stands further illustrates the at-
titude of the United States courts towards this organization, this
same attitude having been shown by the U. S. District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania in the recent case of
Knights of the Ku. Klux Klan v. Strayer, 26 Fed. (2nd) 727, in
which the Klan was denied an injunction restraining the use of
its name by the defendants because of the principle that a party
seeking relief in a court of equity must come in with clean hands,.
which the plaintiff in this base could not do because of its unlaw-
ful acts and conduct.
Although the power and influence of the Klan at present is
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far less than it once was, and one now hears but little of this or-
ganization, it is certain, as was so clearly demonstrated in the
recent presidential campaign and election, that bigotry will al-
ways exist in the minds of a large percentage of the population
of our country; it appears, however, from the attitude taken by
the Court in this case, that bigotry and race prejudice find no fa-
vor with it, but that it is determined to uphold the liberty and
equality guaranteed by the Constitution to all, regardless of race,
color or religion.
J. . Cantv.
ATTACHMENT-Property fraudulently conveyed to de-
fendant's wife.
This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note, of
which the defendant, Frank L. Marston, was the maker. A
writ of attachment issued, and execution was had on real estate
in the name of Ermina B. Marston, wife of the defendant. In
the instructions indorsed on the writ, it was alleged that "said
real estate was conveyed by the defendant, Frank L. Marston, to
his wife, Ermina B. Marston, in fraud of this creditor and with-
out consideration." The wife filed a petition for "leave to inter-
vene and defend against said allegation and said attachment."
From a refusal to allow intervention, the wife brings exceptions.
Mr. Justice Deasy delivered the opinion of the court.
"This case," the court said, "is not within the-statute which
permits an appearance to defend by a grantee in suits against
their grantors in which the property conveyed is attached. The
petitioner fails in that she asks to intervene, not to defend against
the allegations of the declaration, but to defend 'against said
allegation (of fraudulent conveyance) and said attachment,'
matters which are not contained in the declaration, and are not
and can not be made issues in the present case.
"Upon principle and authority, intervention is allowed only
when the rights of the intervenor are directly involved. Here
the petitioner's rights, which by intervention she seeks to de-
fend, are not involved. Intervention is not necessary to pre-
serve or protect them. The question of fraud is an open one,
which can be determined by appropriate procedure."--Exceptions
overruled. Partridge v. Marston, 143 Atl. 599.
Albion M. Griffin.
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CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS-In suit to cancel
note and mortgage, conclusion of law that law was with the
plaintiffs was sufficient for valid judgment.
The appellees in Atlas Securities Company v. Ferrell et. lix, 165
N. E. (Ind.) 709, were husband and wife who owned a farm which
they mortgaged to the appellants to secure a note. Said note
was given upon the understanding that their son would not be
criminally prosecuted because of a fraud which he had worked
upon the appellants.
The lower court stated as conclusions of law that the law
was with the appellees and that the note and mortgage were ex-
ecuted for an illegal and invalid consideration, under duress, and
should be set aside, cancelled and annulled. Appellant complains
that the special findings contain evidentiary facts and that there
are conclusions of law in such findings.
"Had there been no other conclusion of law," said the Ap-
pellate Court, "than that 'the law is with" plaintiffs'-" this would
be sufficient upon which to base a valid judgment. A note ob-
tained by duress and mortgage securing the same must be deliv-
ered up for cancellation. Huntington County State Bank v. Mason,
85 Ind. App. 320, 150 N. E. 20. -
J. R. Harrington.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Statute prohibiting owner-
ship of drug stores or interest in corporations owing such stores
by other than licensed pharmacists held unconstitutional-Cor-
poration is "person" within due process and equal protection
clauses of the 14th Amendment.
Action by the Louis K. Liggett Co. against Thomas J. Bald-
ridge, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and others, to enjoin
them from prosecuting plaintiff for violation of a statute of
Pennsylvania alleged by plaintiff to be unconstitutional. Plain-
tiff was a Massachusetts corporation authorized to do business in
Pennsylvania, and at the time of the passage of the act in ques-
tion was empowered to own and conduct pharmacies and drug
stores in the state, a large number of which were operated by it
at that time. The statute complained of (Pa. St. Supp. 1928, sec.
9377a-1, 9377a-2) provided that every pharmacy or drug store
should be owned only by a licensed pharmacist, and in the case
of corporations, required that all members should be licensed
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pharmacists; corporations owning drug stores at the time of the
passage of the act might continue to operate them, but could not
establish additional stores, and the violation of the statute was
made a misdemeanor. After the passage of the statute, plaintiff,
all of whose stockholders were not licensed pharmacists, took
possession of two additional drug stores, the business of which
was carried on through duly registered phamacists, but a permit
to carry on the business was refused by the State Board of
Pharmacy. In the lower court the statute was held constitu-
tional on the ground that there was a substantial relation to the
public interest in the ownership of a drug store where prescrip-
tions were compounded, and this appeal was taken. Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, Atty. Gen. of Pennsylvania, et al., 49 S. Ct.
57.
In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Sutherland, the Su-
preme Court held the statute to be unconstitutional. Plaintiff's
business, being a property right, was entitled to protection
against state legislation in contravention of the Federal Consti-
tution. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; Tritax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312. A corporation is a "person" within the meaning
of the clue process and equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment, and a foreign corporation permitted to do business
in a state may not be subjected to state statutes in conflict with
this portion of the Cofrstitution. Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.
S. 490; Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Coin., 271 U. S. 583; Kentucky
Co. v. Paramount E.rch., 262 U. S. 544. Unless, therefore, the act
could be justified as a valid exercise of the police power, the
Court held that it must be declared unconstitutional because its
enforcement would deprive plaintiff of its property without due
process of law, which as a result of the 14th Amendment the
state could not do.
In defense of the statute, it was contended that it was rea-
sonably calculated to promote the public health; the question to
be determined was the effect of mere ownership of a drug store
in respect to the public health. Under the power possessed by
the state to regulate the prescription, compounding of prescrip-
tions, and purchase and sale of medicines to the extent reason-
ably necessary to protect the public health, the state had pre-
viously passed certain statutes regulating these matters. By the
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terms of these statutes the owner of a drug store, whether a li-
censed pharmacist or not, could not purchase or dispense impure
or inferior medicines; he could not, unless a licensed physician,
prescribe for the sick; he could not, unless he be a licensed pharm-
acist, have charge of a drug store or compound a prescription.
Because of these statutes, it was held that every point at which
the public health was likely to be affected by the act of the owner
in buying, compounding or selling drugs and medicines was
amply safeguarded. The act in question did not deal with any of
the matters covered by these statutes, but dealt in terms only
with ownership. "It is a matter of public notoriety," said the
court, "that chain drug stores in great numbers, owned and oper-
ated by corporations, are to be found throughout the United
States. They have been in operation for many years. We take
judicial notice of the fact that the stock in these corporations is
bought and sold upon the various stock exchanges of the country
and must be held and owned to a large extent by persons who are
not registered pharmacists. If detriment to the public health
thereby has resulted or is threatened, some evidence of it ought to
be forthcoming. None has been produced and so far as we are
informed, either, by the record or outside of it, none exists." Be-
cause of this lack of evidence, the Court held that the statute for-
bade the exercise of an ordinary property right and denied what
is guaranteed by the Constitution; a state can not, under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable
and unnecessary restrictions on them. Burns Baking Co. v.
Br yan, 264 U. S. 504; Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402;
Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1.
A dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice Brandeis joined,
was given by Mr. Justice Holmes, on the ground that the selling
of drugs and poisons calls for knowledge in a high degree, and
that the divorce between this knowledge and the power of control
is an evil and a situation to which the police power of the state
should be allowed to extend.
As a result of the ever-increasing growth of the chain store
movement, the recent decisions in controversies based on the
right of the states to subject them to more rigorous control
than that exercised over privately owned businesses of a like na-
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ture have shown a tendency on the part of the courts to recognize
in the chain store the same degree of freedom in conducting its
business as is possessed by the individually owned concern. In
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. et al. v. Doughton, 144 S. E. (N.
C.) 701, it was held that the state could not lawfully impose a
license tax on each store owned by any person or corporation
operating six or more stores within the state, on the grounds that
this was unreasonable classification. And because of the fact
that it has been and is the policy of the Supreme Court to jeal-
ously safeguard property rights against state legislation when
such legislation contravenes the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment, it is extremely improbable that statutes discrimin-
ating against chain stores merely because they are such will in
the near future be upheld by this Court, notwithstanding its
ready and repeated recognition of the police power possessed by
the states, under which violations of Constitutional guaranties
are so frequently excused.
I. J. Canty.
CRIMINAL LAW-One convicted of statutory rape not
entitled to writ coram nobis on the ground that the conviction
was secured by perjured testimony.
Defendant was convicted of statutory rape. The prosecut-
ing witness, five years after the defendant had been convicted,
filed an affidavit stating she perjured herself when testifying
against the defendant in that she had never had sexual inter-
course with the defendant whereas in the original trial she testi-
fied that he had had such with her. She further stated that the
defendant was convicted upon her uncorroborated testimony.
Shock v. State, 164 N. E. (Ind.) 625.
The Indiana Supreme Court held the defendant was not en-
titled to the writ asked as the evidence of the prosecuting witness
was corroborated, "there being testimony of two police officers-
that appellant immediately after his arrest confessed to them-
that he had had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix".
There is no doubt that a writ coram nobis should have been
granted if the evidence of the prQsecutrix had been uncorrobor-
ated. And merely because it was corroborated by a confession
given police officers does not appear as sufficient reason for re-
fusing the writ. If the writ had been issued, the question could
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then have been raised as to the competency of the confession as
to whether or not it was voluntary or involuntary and it would
have been upon the State to prove it a voluntary confession. In
a retrial it might be found that the confession would not in itself,
be sufficient to convict the accused. J. R. Rarringjton.
INSURANCE-Violation of inventory and iron safe clause
of fire insurance policy held no defense to action on policy.
One Hyden, owner of a general store, insured his stock of
goods and fixtures in a policy issued by the defendant. The
property covered by the policy was completely destroyed by fire
and the defendant having refused to pay the loss this action was
instituted. The defense was that the inventory and iron safe
clause of the policy had been violated by the assured. A de-
murrer to the answer was sustained in the circuit court and judg-
ment rendered for Hyden for the total amount of the policy. This
judgment was affirmed on appeal. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.
v. Hyden, Kentucky, 10 S. W. (2nd) 829.
The clause violated contained provisions that insured take
inventory of stock at least once every twelve months, that he
should keep set of books showing business transacted and keep
such books at night either in a fireproof safe or in some secure
place not exposed to fire which would destroy building where the
insured's business was carried on. In case of loss such books and
inventory had to be produced by insured.
The court said that the ruling of the lower court, that the
violation of such clause was not a defense to an action on the
policy, was in accordance with the established rule in Kentucky
upon this point, citing Phoenix Ins. Co. z,. Angel, 38 S. W. 1067;
London. Guarantee & Accidemnt Co. v. Massman, 283 S. W. 1051;
insurance is a voluntary business and no insurance company is
required to insure property unless it is satisfied with the condi-
tions under which the insured property is kept. The course of
decisions regarding the validity of inventory and iron safe clauses
of fire insurance policies, well understood and long followed,
should not be departed from, where not required by imperious de-
mands of justice.
There was a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Thomas in
which two-other members of the court concurred. He stated
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that every court of last resort in the Union and all text writers
oppose the doctrine set out in the majority opinion as being en-
tirely out of harmony with the otherwise universal law upon the
subject and likewise, as not supported by logic or reason. Han-
over Fire Insurance Co. v. Wood, 213 Ala. 132, 39 A. L. R. 1436,
and numerous cases there cited.
The doctrine of the majority opinion was first promulgated
in the Angel Case, cited above, where it was said that what is
commonly termed the iron safe clause in insurance policies was
"without consideration". In other states such clauses are con-
sidered as promissory warranties and are valid, being supported
by the same consideration that passes between the parties for all
other obligations and promises they each assume and make under
the terms of the insurance contract.
The only ground upon which the opinion in the Angel Case
can be followed is upon the doctrine of stare decisis, but as the
rule there founded has been followed by only two other cases, the
Massman -Case, cited above, and Mechanics' & Traders' Insurance
Co. v. Floyd, 49 S. W. 543, the fixed rule of property upon which
the doctrine of stare decisis is built cannot be regarded as es-
tablished by those decisions.
"Moreover, experience and observation convinces me," said
Judge Thomas, "that to uphold such a clause would be in further-
ance of promoting honesty and uprightness rather than entailing
of hardships. The requirements of the policy condition are not
difficult to comply with, and everything considered, I think now
is the time to correct the glaring error into which this court has
fallen, and to discontinue traveling in that path". ,
D. M. Donahue.
JOINT ADVENTURE-Coadventurer was entitled to in-
terest in renewal lease secured by other party to adventure with-
out his knowledge or consent.
In 1902 one Gerry leased to the defendant Salmon certain
premises for twenty years. Salmon and the plaintiff, by a writ-
ing, agreed that plaintiff was to pay Salmon half of the money to
be used on the leased property and was to share equally with him
the.losses. Each was to receive a certain percentage of the pro-
fits and Salmon was to have sole power to manage, lease and
operate the building on the property. In 1922, with less than
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four months left for the lease to run, Gerry made a new lease
with Salmon. Salmon did not inform plaintiff of the making of
the new lease but when latter found out about it he demanded
that lease be held in trust as assef of the venture. Upon suit
plaintiff was held entitled to equitable interest in one-half the
whole lease. On appeal judgment was modified and affirmed by
a four to three decision of the Court of Appeals. Meinhard v.
Salmon et al., New York, 164 N. E. 545.
Plaintiff and defendant were joint adventurers and while the
enterprise continued owed to one another the duty of the finest
loyalty. Salmon was not only joint adventurer but he was man-
ager as well and had the appearance, to observers, of holding lease
as owner in his own right when in fact he held it as fiduciary for
himself and another in a common venture. - As coadventurer he
was subject to fiduciary duties akin to those of a partner. King
v. Barnes, 109 N. Y. 267; and as managing coadventurer the rule
of undivided loyalty as applied to him was relentless and su-
preme. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439.
Salmon by his conduct excluded his coadventurer from any
chance to enjoy the opportunity for benefit that had come to him
alone by virtue of his agency. This chance, if nothing more, he
was under a duty to concede. The price of its denial is the ex-
tension of a trust at the option and for the benefit of the one
whom he excluded. The constructive trust is the remedial de-
vice through which preference to self is made subordinate to
loyalty to others. Beatty v. Geggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.
Y. 380.
It was shown that in 1917 plaintiff assigned his interest in the
lease to his wife to which assignment Salmon did not object.
There was a reassignment before the commencement of this ac-
tion. As to the assignment, the court said that there was no in-
flexible rule in such conditions that dissolution should ensue
against the concurring wish of all that the venture should con-
tinue. Then the assignment is a question of intention. Durkee
v. Gunn, 41 Kan. 496. The facts in this case plainly showed an
intention by all the parties to continue the venture and Salmon
could not now claim that venture was dissolved by the assign-
ment.
In order to secure to Salmon the control which under the or-
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iginal agreement he had over the property of the venture the
court modified the judgment of the lower court by providing that
the trust attach to the shares of stock rather than to the lease and
that Salmon take one-half the stock plus an additional share, the
residue to go to plaintiff.
The dissenting portion of the court expressed its views in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Andrews in which it was said that the
plaintiff had only an equitable interest in the first lease, Salmon
having legal title, and plaintiff had therefore no share in the ex-
pectance of the renewal of the lease. The adventure was for a
limited time, that is, twenty years, and it terminated at the ex-
piration of that period. Upon its termination plaintiff's equitable
interest in the lease also ended, as his equity was in the lease and
not in any possibility of renewal. Salmon had, therefore, the
right to make the new lease.
D. M. Donahue.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Where taxi-driver was or-
dered by police officer to pursue party, danger of pursuit incid-
ental to driving was forseeable risk of employment and was not a
departure from duty constituting abandonment of employment
so as to exempt the employer from liability.
In the case of Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, reported
in 164 N. E. (N. Y.) decided on December 31, 1928, it appeared
that Babington was employed as a chauffeur by the Yellow Taxi
Corporation and while so employed met his death through ac-
cident in operating one of the company's cabs. A closer inquiry
into the facts shows that a police officer jumped on the running
board and ordered the driver to chase another car in order to ar-
rest its occupant. Suddenly another vehicle cut across the path
and a collision resulted, from which death ensued. The question
then was, whether Babington. under the circumstances, could
be said to be in the performance of his duty towards his employer
so as to make the employer liable for compensation to his widow
for his death. The Supreme Court and the Appellate Division
(two lower courts) affirmed a decision of the state compensation
board allowing an award for death benefits. From this decision,
the Yellow Taxi Corporation appealed.
A New York statute made it a misdemeanor for anyone to re-
fuse to aid an officer in need of aid in arresting any person, or in
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retaking any person who has escaped from legal custody, or in
executing any legal process Penal Law (Consol. Laws c. 40)
section 1848. The court held in effect that the Yellow Taxi Cor-
poration, an incorporeal being, would have been bound to re-
spond, under the terms of this .statute, to the summons of the
officer if it had been sitting in the driver's seat. Babington, be-
ing its agent, acted for it, and while so acting was in the course
of a special employment which the employer (the corporation)
was bound to take cognizance of atid the performance of this spe-
cial employment was not such a departure from the course of
duty as to constitute an abandonment of the general employment.
The general employer was therefore held liable and the order of
the lower courts was affirmed.
J. S. Angelino.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Where death of driver of
team resulted from fall from seat of wagon which passed over
driver's body and occurred while driver was in course of his em-
ployment, and driver's position from which he fell was due en-
tirely to his employment, held accidental injury arose out of em-
ployment.
In the case of Mausert z. Albany Builder's Sitppl, Co., re-
ported in 164 N. E. (N. Y.) 729, decided on December 31, 1928,
the facts were as follows: Mausert was employed as a teamster
by the Albany Builder's Supply Co. While driving his horses at
a walk over a smooth pavement, he fell from his seat, and two
wheels passed over his body. Within three hours he died. There
was no evidence that his fall was intentional and the carrier at
the hearing expressly disclaimed an attempt to prove intoxica-
tion, these being the only two reasons for barring compensation
for injuries or death resulting from such causes. For a reversal
of an award for death benefits allowed by the compensation
board, the claimant, who was the mother of deceased, appealed.
The question was whether there was evidence to sustain the
finding of the compensation board. The counsel for respondent
contended that the deceased was ill at the time of the fall causing
his death. The court said, "a physical seizure unrelated to the
employment is not such an accident as is compensable. It is the
fall and the injury resulting from it that constitutes an accident
within the purview of the statute. The cause may be disregarded
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and the inquiry limited to the investigation to disclose whether
the fall bore with it such consequences as would not have -oc-
curred, except for the employment". Judgment of lower court
reversed. J. S. Angelino.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liability Tor negligence.
When acting in good faith, a municipal corporation is not liable
for negligence in the exercise of a governmental function. It is,
however, liable when such negligence occurs in the exercise of
private or corporate powers. These principles are .well estab-
lished, but it is the application of the principles which is fraught
with difficulty. Witness the case of Tillman v. District of Colum-
bia, 29 Fed. (2nd) 442, recently decided by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia.
The action was brought in the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict by George Tillman, an infant, by next friend, to recover
damages for personal injuries occasioned .by the negligence of
the defendant. The lower court sustained a general demurrer to
the declaration and plaintiff appealed.
The District of Columbia set up and operated on one of its
streets a water sprinkler or shower for the comfort, pleasure and
amusement of the children of the community. Plaintiff, an infant
nine years of age, was run over by an automobile while playing
under and around the sprinkler, sustaining a broken leg and other
injuries. Plaintiff alleged that it was the duty of defendant to
provide adequate protection for the care and safety of the chil-
dren, that defendant failed to provide the necessary protection,
and that as a result of such failure plaintiff received the injuries
aforesaid. In support of its demurrer defendant argued that the
maintaining of the sprinkler was a governmental function and
that therefore the municipality was not liable for negligence in
connection therewith. As authority for the above mentioned
general principles governing the liability of municipal corpora-
tions for negligence, the opinion cites the case of Harris z,. District
of Columbia, 256 U. S. 650, 652, 41 S. Ct. 610, 65 L. Ed. 1146, 16 A.
L. R. 1471. The court, in laying down the distinguishing elements
of a governmental function and the rules of liability applicable
thereto, made the following quotation from the case of Bolster v.
Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 389, 114 N. E. 722, 723, L. R. A. 1917B,
1285:
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"The municipality, in the absence of special statute impos-
ing liability, is not liable for the tortious acts of its officers and
servants in connection with the gratuitous performance of
strictly public functions, imposed by mandate of the Legislature
or undertaken voluntarily by its permission, from which it de-
rived: no special corporate advantage, no pecuniary profit, and no
enforced contribution upon individuals particularly benefited by
way of compensation for use or assessment for betterments ....
The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good
of all without the element of special corporate benefit or pecun-
iary profit."
Since the facts alleged bring the act within the purview of
the citation above set forth, the appellate court held that the
maintenance of the sprinkler was a public function exercised for
the general public welfare, and therefore defendant was not liable
for the negligence alleged in plaintiff's declaration.
Henry Hasley.
TRADE MARKS-TRADE NAMES-UNFAIR COM-
PETITION.
The Yellow Cab Company of Camden, N. J., had its prin-
cipal stand at the Pennsylvania Railroad terminal in that city.
It enjoyed there, and in other cities, an established business, as
well as a valuable business reputation and patronage. Defend-
ant operated a taxicab at the same terminal. Prior to February
18, 1923, defendant's cab was of a dark color; on that date, de-
fendant's cab appeared in a garb of yellow. On March 1, plain-
tiff filed a bill of complaint and asked an injunctoin lite.
Vice-Chancellor Leaming, in granting the injunction, said:
"There is not, in my mind, the slightest doubt but that the re-
semblance of defendant's taxicab to the taxicabs of the complain-
ant will nec.essarily deceive the traveling public by leading peo-
ple who seek taxicab service to believe that the taxicab of the de-
fendant is a taxicab operated by the complainant. Complainant's
cars are widely advertised and favorably known to the public, and
their peculiarly conspicuous color has brought them to the at-
tention of almost everyone who has occasion to use taxicabs.
Some specific differences in the cars are pointed out in detail in
defendant's-affidavits, but an inspection of the cars clearly dis-
closes that by reason of the general appearance of defendant's car
it will, in practical operation, necessarily be mistaken for one of
the cars of the complainant. Restraint pendente lite will be or-
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dered." Yellow Cab Company v. Knox, (N. J: Ch.) 144 At. 11.
Albion M. Griffin.
WAR-United States-Alien Property Custodian-Rents
and Damages. The Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia, in the case of von Bruning z. Sutherland, Alien Property Cus-
todian, et al., 29 Fed. (2nd) 631, denied the right of an alien enemy
to recover for rent and for damages to premises while in the pos-
session of the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with
the Enemy Act. Marion von Bruning was a natural born citizen
of the United States, but prior to the declaration of hostilities be-
tween this country and Germany in the late war, she had inter-
married with a German subject, thereby acquiring German cit-
izenship and bringing her within the provisions of the Trading
with the Enemy Act. Frau von Bruning was the owner of a life
estate in a house and lot in the city of Washington, D. C. The
defendant Alien Property Custodian tok possession of the same
and remained in possession for twenty-eight months. The prem-
ises during this period were used for departmental offices and
alterations had been made to adapt them for such use. Upon the
return of the property to the plaintiff pursuant to the Amend-
ment approved June 5, 1920, plaintiff was paid $900.00 as rent for
the premises. In her complaint she alleged that the rental value
of the property during that period was $500.00 per month and
that the property was damaged to the extent of $6000.00 by rea-
son of the alterations aforesaid. The lower court dismissed the
action upon motion by the defendants, upon the ground that it
was an attempt to recover an obligation alleged to be due from
the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Banco Mexicano
v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591, 602, 44 S. Ct. 209, 212, 68 L. Ed.
465, held that such a proceeding was in effect a suit against the
United States, and that therefore it cannot be maintained without
previous permission from the United States. No authorization
of the suit on the part of the United States was shown. The
Trading with the Enemy Act as amended provided merely for
the recovery of property from the Alien Property Custodian by
one not an enemy or ally of enemy. Here plaintiff was not at-
tempting to regain her property, because it had already been re-
turned to her, and the right of the Alien Property Custodian to
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seize the property in the first instance was not even questioned.
This action, therefore, was not authorized by the Act, and as
plaintiff failed to show any other authorization, her proceeding
necessarily failed.
That "the king can do no wrong" may be an old maxim, but
it is not without its present day applications. Provisions such
as these are constitutional. Witness the words of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of United States v. Chemical
Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 11, 47 S. Ct. 1, 5, 71 L. Ed. 131: "Con-
gress was untrammeled and free to authorize the seizure, use or
appropriation of such properties without any compensation to the
owners. There is no constitutional prohibition against confisca-
tion of enemy properties."
Decree of dismissal affirmed.
Henry Hasley.
ATCHISON T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. TIEFEL, Circuit Ct. of
Appeals, 9th Circuit. November 5th, 1928.
Appeal from the Dist. Ct. of the U. S. for the So. Div. of the
So. Dist. of California.
Dietrich, Circuit Judge, formerly Federal Court Judge of
Idaho.
In this action for personal injuries, suffered by the plaintiff,
that the plaintiff was riding on the defendants train as a free
passenger, with the acquiesence of the defendant, which pass con-
tained a stipulation, signed by the plaintiff in which the plain-
tiff was purported to accept all risks of accident, to person or
baggage.
Plaintiff in her complaint alleged that the defendants train
was conducted so negligently and carelessly and at such a high
and dangerous rate of speed, in excess of sixty miles per hour,
that the train left the track.
The plaintiff testifying as to the rate of speed and from other
testimony appears that the defendant carrier, was derailed on a
sharp curve,-"Almost a semi-horseshoe curve," that the regular
and ordered rate of speed at such curve was thirty-five miles per
hour.
Defendant contended plaintiff in her complaint characterized
the negligence acts which she pleaded as "gross" negligence was
a variance and the court should not have submitted the case to
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the jury on the theory that the proof of the accident resulted from
gross negligence, without the plaintiff showing such, and being
the plaintiff did not prove gross negligence, she was not entitled
to recovery. N. P. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440, S. C. T. 48 L.
Ed. 513, 159 Cal. 769. 116 Pac. 51.
Sec. 2175 of the Cal. Code, the court held :-provides that, "a
common carrier can not be exonerated, by any agreement made in
anticipation thereof, from liability for the gross negligence fraud
or willful wrong of himself for his servants".
We cannot say that a finding of gross negligence was: un-
warranted. Judgement affirmed.
T. J. Jones, Jr.
PEARSON v. FRANK, Sup. Ct. of Idaho. December 17th,
1928.
Plaintiff brought suit to foreclose a mechanics lien on the
defendants dwelling house, alleging in substance, that the plain-
tiff was obligated under an oral contract to furnish materials and
perform work and labor in repairing and adding to said building
for a certain consideration due-performance-non-payment in
part-filing of lien, etc.
Defendant in his answer admitted the contract, but denied
that all the materials were furnished and alleged in other partic-
ulars the work was not done in a good and wormanlike manner.
Plaintiff contends that the substantial performance of the
contract was all that was required. 9 C. J. 739. .
The Court in finding for the defendant said, "We do not un-
derstand that the defendant takes issue with the plaintiff as to
the law appliable, which in substance, is found in 9 C. J. 759-749,
and the dispute presents, therefore, solely a question of fact. 9
C. J. 748 Sec. 83.
Which not without conflict, there is sufficient evidence to
support the finding and conclusions of the trial Court and, render
the well known rule, where evidence, though conflicting, sup-
ports trial courts' findings and conclusions, judgment will be
affirmed.
T. J. Jones, Jr.
STATES-In the case of Shear v. State, reported in 223 N.
W. 130, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that recovery can-
not be had for damages caused by negligence of officer, agent, or
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employee of the state, without express provision therefor by law.
This is an action for damages sustained by the plaintiff,
caused by the alleged negligence of the agents of the state in
placing an obstruction in a highway.which was exclusively under
the control and maintenance of the state through its highway de-
partment ,and thereby causing plaintiff's car to overturn and in-
jure him and his car. The action was authorized by a resolution
of the Senate, which purports to give authority to the plaintiff to
prosecute his suit to final judgment in the district court for
Dodge county, for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating
his claim and the liability of the state for the payment thereof.
The state interposed a general demurrer, that the petition does
not state a cause of action against the defendant. This demurrer
was sustained and plaintiff's action dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.
The court in its opinion said that it may be laid down as a
universal rule that a state is not liable to a person injured by the
negligence of its employees, unless there is a statute or constitu-
tional provision permitting recovery therefor. A resolution by
one branch of the Legislature, authorizing an individual to main-
tain action against the state to recover damages caused by the
negligence of a state's employee, does not render the state liable
for the negligent acts of its employee, in the absence of a statute
making the state liable therefor.
36 Cyc. 315 states :---"By consenting to be sued, a state sim-
ply waives its immunity from 'suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability, and sub-
mits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense."
It has been contended that when the Legislature uses the
word "claims" as expressed in section 1100, it included a claim for
tort or negligence. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Mur-
dock Parlor Grate Co. v. Comnonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 24 N. E.
854, 8 L. R. A. 399, which was an action for tort, construing a
statute which gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of "all
claims against the Commonwealth, whether at law or in equity,"
uses this language: "while the words 'all claims may, in their
colloquial use, include a demand for damages occasioned by a tort
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to person or property, in its more proper judicial sense it is a de-
mand of some matter as of right made by one person upon an-
other for some particular thing, or compensation therefor, or to
do or to forbear, to do something as a matter of duty"--and the
court held in that case that their statute did not permit a recovery
against the state for damages resulting from misfeasance or neg-
ligence of its officers and agents.
Wisconsin had a statute which provides that it shall be com-
petent for any person deeming himself aggrieved by the refusal
of the Legislature to allow any just claim against the state to
commence an action against the state by filing a complaipt, etc.,
and their Supreme Court held, in Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 482, 74
N. W. 111, 42 L. R. A. 39, that the statute relates only to claims
which, if allowed, render the state a debtor to the claimant, and
does not include a demand based upon unlawful or tortious acts
of officers and agents of the state.
The Legislature has not by law granted to any one the right
to recover against the state damages for negligence of any of its
officers,, agents, or employees, and, until such legislation is en-
acted, no recovery against the state can be had for such neglig-
ence. It therefore follows that the district court properly sus-
tained the demurrer and dismissed plaintiff's action, and its judg-
ment is affirmed.
F. Earl Lambolev.
EASEMENTS-The Supreme Court of Minn. held, in the
case of Sabin z,. Rea et al. reported in 223 N. W. 151, that where
an easement is not definitely located, the grantee may make the
location, and of reasonable his selection cannot be questioned.
This is an action to restrain the defendants from interfering with
the use by the plaintiff of a stairway and landing between the
plaintiff's building and the building of the defendants. In their
answer the defendants asked that the plaintiff be enjoined from
using an opening placed by her in the party wall between the two
buildings. There were findings for the plaintiff, and the defend-
ants appeal to the Supreme Court.
The court held that where a party grants an easement and
does not definitely designafe or locate it, the grantee may make
the location, and if it is reasonable his selection cannot be ques-
tioned. 91 Minn. 270; 97 N. W. 973; L. Ann. Cas. 680. In the
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party wall agreement there was no definite lotation. It is the
rule that when a designation has been made by the grantee and
there has been long acquiescence in the use of it, the grantee may
not thereafter change the location. 85 Mich. 165; 48 N. W. 533;
65 Vt. 333; 26 A. 690; 36 Am. St. Rep. 864; 159 Ind. 562, 64 N. E.
910; 65 N. E. 752; 95 Am. St. Rep. 315. (See note 5 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 851.)
It is the contention of .the defendants in this case that, the
easement having been located and its use defined and acquiesced
in for so many years, it cannot now be changed without their
consent. There is force in this argument. Here, however, the
party wall agreement contemplated that there would be a recon-
struction of the wooden building, which had been destroyed by
fire. The court finds that the opening made by the plaintiff was
conveniently located so that the plaintiff and others using the
second floor of her building could use the stairway in the defend-
ant's building; that the parties when making the party wall
agreement contemplated the construction of a new building
which would made convenient use of the party wall; that the
opening has been conveniently located; and that the defendants
have not been damaged by the new opening and that it will not
interfere 'with the use of their buildings. The court said that in
view of the fact that another building on the south 50 feet, which
could make convenient use of the stairway and party wall, was
contemplated, and that the new entrance gives such use with no
substantial harm to the defendants, the decree of the lower court
should be sustained. F. Earl Lambolev.
BANKS AND BANKING-The Supreme Court of Iowa,
held, in the case of Heckman v. Ottumwa National Bank, reported
in 223 N. W. 164, that a "special deposit" exists when a fund is
placed in the bank for a specific and particular purpose. The
Citizens' Bank of Sigourney cqlosed its doors and ceased to do
business on the- morning of March 4, 1924. Prior to that date
the cashier drew a draft for $7,750 payable to appellant, on the
Ottumwa National Bank, appellee. The draft was delivered to
appellant in the forenoon of February, 1924, and on March 3rd,
deposited by him in the Farmers' Bank at Woodward, Iowa, for
collection. It was presented to appellee on March 6th and pay-
ment was refused on the ground that the Sigourney bank had
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ceased to do business.
The court held that a "special deposit" exists when a fund is
placed in the bank for a specificand particular purpose, 153 Iowa
289, 133 N. W. 669; 197 Iowa 150, 197 N. W. 51; 197 Iowa 227,
196 N. W. 17; 198 Iowa 809, 200 N. W. 428. But here the apel-
lant failed to establish a special deposit or such equitable circum-
stances as worked an equitable assignment of the funds.
F. Earl Lamboley.
TAXATION-
Gulf Public Service Co. v. Louisiana Tax Commission. Court
of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit. Dec. 4, 1928.
Attorney's fees of 10% of amount of tax involved are prop-
erly added in favor of assessors when plaintiff's appeal from an
assessment fails to reduce the assessment more than 25%.
In the case of Gulf Public Service Co. v. Louisiana Tax Com-
mission, the plaintiff questioned the assessment upon his plant
and equipment, and upon city lots it owned. The assessment on
the lots was reduced, but that on the plant and equipment af-
firmed. The total reduction amounted to far lass than 25%. A
revised statute provided that in suits to reduce assessments, in
case of a failure to reduce, or to reduce more than 25%, the as-
sessment of the assessors, the commission of the assessors' at-
torney, fixed at 10% of the amount of tax involved, is to be added
to the tax. The complainant objected to the addition of this
commission because he had won a partial reduction of. assess-
ments. Hsi theory was that one seeking a reduction of assess-
ments and winning a partial reduction is not liable for assessors'
attorney fees. The court decided that the theory of the statute
was that you were unsuccessful unless you reduced your assess-
ment over 25%. The statute had been upheld and followed in
prior cases cited. W. Konop.
AUTOMOBILES-
Thompson v. Morgan. Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second
Circuit. June 28, 1928.
It is the duty of automobile drivers to look and listen at
railroad crossings, and the duty of the vehicle on the railway
track to give warning of approach.
In the case of Thompson v. Morgan. a railroad motor car oper-
ated by the plaintiff collided with the automobile of the defend-
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ant at- the intersection of an highway with railroad tracks. The
accident took place in -the daytime; the driver of the automobile
failed to look and listen; and the defendant sounded no warning.
The plaintiff recovered in the lower court on proof of the defend-
ants failure to look and listen, his theory being that the vehicle
operated on the tracks has the right of way at all highway cross-
ings and so the defendant 'in invading his right of way without
first exercising due care was negligent and liable for the injury
done the plaintiff. On appeal the court pointed out that though
'the defendant was negligent the plaintiff in failing to give warn-
ing of his approach was so contributorially negligent as to bar his
right of recovery, for his negligence united with the defendant's
to create the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
W. Konop.
AUTOMOBILES-This is an action wherein the plaintiff
seeks damages against the defendants for injuries caused by a
door falling from an automobile. The defendants had invited
the plaintiff to ride in their automobile and to sit therein while
they were eating dinner. The plaintiff was injured as she was
about to enter the car to wait for the owners.
The question raised in the case relates to the construction of
section 5026bl of the 1927 Code, which reads as follows: "The
owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any
damages to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle
as a guest or by invitation and not for hire, unless damage is
caused as a result of thedriver of said motor vehicle being under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or because of the reckless
operation by him of such motor vehicle."
The court said that the point to be decided was whether or
not the appellant was a passenger at the time of her injury or not.
To determine the purpose of the legislature in describing the re-
lationship designated as "passenger" the court considered the
modifying words and phrases employed to express the exact
thought in the premises.
The court decided that to be a passenger one must be on a
journey in a motor vehicle driven or operated by some one, and
that the one called a "passenger" must be "riding in" the car;
also that entrance must be made into an automobile then in the
operation of a driver so that a journey can be. taken: There can
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be no trip without a driver. Thus a person in such a motor car
without a driver operating it is not a passenger within the mean-
ing of the section under consideration; for in the absence of the
necessary operator there can be no journey and consequently no
riding. Without the driver, the journey, and the riding there is
no passenger in the case at bar for "driver" is not mentioned in
the pleading. At the time the appellant attempted to enter the
conveyance, no one was in actual charge thereof so far as her
petition revealed. Hence she was not a passenger for the pur-
pose of the legislation under consideration because no driver was
operating the machine. Puckett v. Paitthorpe et al, 223 N. W.
254 (Iowa). Marc Wonderlin.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Prosecution and conviction
of Jim Price and others for manufacture of intoxicating liquors,
possessing property designed therefor, and possessing such liquor
was reversed for the following reason: the evidence was insuffi-
cient to sustain conviction of the substantive offense of aiding
and abetting manufacture or possession, altho such evidence
would tend to establish guilt of conspiracy. The evidence ad-
duced showed that one Owens was engaged in distilling whisky,
that he had a particular batch of still beer ready for distillation,
that he undertook to carry materials for the use in this distillation
to his still, that he hired the four appellants to assist him in the
transportation of the materials, that the four appellants knew of
the purpose of the materials, that they did not know of the exist-
ence of the still beer, and that the materials were stopped in
transit. The court said: "If, ***, the allegation of the-indict-
ment with reference to the manufacture of intoxicating liquor be
referred to the still beer, these appellants had no part in it, * * *;
the manufacture having been finished before their acts. If the
indictment refers to the distillation step, these applicants could
not have aided nor abetted, because it never took place. Their
casual helping in the transportation cannot be considered that
possession, either of materials or of liquor, which the law pun-
ishes." Price et al v. United States, 29 F (2nd) 995.
Albert T. Frantz.
BURGLARY-Breaking Close.
Venice Gibbons was convicted of burglary in the second de-
gree for entering an uninclosed building, and. removing certain-
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aluminum therefrom. From this conviction he appealed. People
v. Gibbons, 273 P. (Cal.) 32.
Appellant contended that the verdict is contrary t6 the evid-
ence. He grounds his contention in that the structure from which
property was alleged to have been stolen consisted of a bin open
on one side; and that therefore the essential element of breaking
was not present. Contention of the appellant was sustained.
In the language of the court, the defendant could not be con-
victed of burglary, where the structure from which property was
alleged to have been stolen consisted of a bin having only three
side and a roof, since the breaking into some kind of a structure
is an essential element of burglary.
Justice Shenk dissented, and as reasons for his objection
stated that even though the structure was, for convenience, left
open on one side that would not in his opinion remove the struct-
ure from the definition of a building as contemplated by the Cali-
fornia Code.
In his opinion, he stated that breaking is not now an essential
element of the crime, and that entry only is required to be alleged
and proved. This opinion is not grounded upon authority but
upon a construction of the statute as he interprets it.
Two interesting cases are cited in the majority opinion. The
first is People v. Coffee, 52 Cal. App. 118 which holds that a chick-
en house is a proper subjec.t for burglary. The second is People
v. Franco, 79 Cal. App. 682 which holds that a showcase which is
under the roof of a store building is a house within the meaning
of section 459 of the California Penal Code. Ivan Le Blanc.
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